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INSURANCE-MOTOR VEHICLES-"Newly Acquired
Automobile" Clause Extended To Cover
Previously Owned Inoperable VehiclesNational Indem. Co. v. Giampapa*
Plaintiff insurance company brought an action for a declaratory
judgment that it be held not liable on a policy it had issued to the
insured motorist. A party injured in an accident involving the
insured had obtained a judgment against the insured in a suit which
the insurer defended with a reservation of rights. Although a 1949
Cadillac was the "Described Automobile" in the insurance policy,
the insured was driving a 1956 Ford at the time of the accident. The
trial court found that during the term of the policy the Cadillac had
become inoperable 1 and was replaced by the Ford which the
insured had owned before the insurance policy was issued. Although
the Ford had not previously been operable, it was put in working
order when the Cadillac could no longer be used. The insured contended that when the 1956 Ford replaced the Cadillac, it became
automatically covered under the policy's "Newly Acquired Automobile" clause, 2 since the insurance policy specifically stated that
notice of a substitution need not be given to the insurer.3 The
action of the insurance company was dismissed. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Washington, held, affirmed, three judges dissenting. The 1956 Ford was covered by the "Newly Acquired Automobile" clause and the insurance company was liable on the policy.
The dissenters argued that an automobile is not "newly acquired" within the meaning of the insurance policy unless it is
purchased subsequent to the issuance of the policy. The dissent
• 399 P.2d 81 (Vvash. 1965) [hereinafter cited as principal case].
I. The term "operable" refers to whether an automobile is capable of being used
on the road, i.e. in "working condition." Lynam v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp.,
218 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Del. 1963), affd, 331 F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 1964); Brown v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957) (car without
an engine held inoperable); Maryland Indem. &: Fire Ins. Exch. v. Steers, 221 Md.
380, 388, 157 A.2d 803, 808 (Ct. App. 1960). Similarly, a car is inoperable while undergoing repairs. Royer v. Shawnee Mut. Ins. Co., 91 Ohio Ct. App. 356, 359, 106 N.E.2d
784, 786 (1950). Of course, while an automobile is used by someone, it is operable.
Yenowine v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 342 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1965) (used by
insured's son).
2. The relevant parts of the clause are: "(4) Newly Acquired Automobile-an
automobile, ownership of which is acquired by the named insured or his spouse if a
resident of the same household, if (i) it replaces an automobile owned by either and
covered by his policy ••.." Principal case at 83. The clause in the principal case,
like all other such clauses extending automatic coverage, includes only damages resulting from the operation of the vehicle, and not those resulting from fire or theft.
See note 3 infra.
3. The policy reads: "[B]ut such notice is not required under coverages A, B and
division 1 of coverage C if the newly acquired automobile replaces an owned auto•
mobile covered by this policy . • • ." Principal case at 83. The above coverages were
for property damage and bodily injury.
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accords with the great weight of authority4 which reasons that, since
"newly" indicates "recently," 5 the parties only contemplated purchases made after coverage ensued. 6 The majority of courts have
held that no other reasonable interpretation of the clause is possible,
and in the absence of an ambiguity a court is not authorized to add
or detract from the plain language of such clauses. 7
Despite an almost unbroken line of contrary decisions, it would
appear that the approach of the principal case is in accord with
public policy and with the true intent of the parties. The words
"Newly Acquired," which the majority of courts have interpreted
as precluding coverage of previously owned vehicles, appear only
in the caption of clauses extending automatic coverage. 8 The clause
merely requires that ownership be acquired-not acquired at a particular time-and that the vehicle replace the automobile described
in the policy.9 Captions are not indicative of the intentions of the
parties to a contract, 10 since they are typically not a complete and
accurate description of the contractual provisions they preface.
Moreover, the majority found that the language was subject to
more than one reasonable interpretation. The term "newly," when
read in light of the whole clause, may have referred to the use of the
vehicle replacing the "Described Automobile," rather than the acquisition of ownership, and to "acquire" may have meant to bring
into use a means of transportation not previously available. Under
this approach, when one obtains title to an inoperable vehicle he
would not be acquiring an automobile within the meaning of the
policy, since the policy is only concerned with automobiles that can
be driven. Finding that the clause is thus subject to these conflicting
interpretations, the majority, applying the general rule of construing documents against the drafters, ruled in the insured's favor. 11
4. E.g., Yenowine v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 342 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1965);
Lyman v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 383 (D. Del. 1963), affd, 331
F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 1964); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shaffer, 250 N.C. 45,
108 S.E.2d 49 (1959); Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 340 S."W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960); see 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw & PRACTICE § 4293 (1962); 12 COUCH, INSURANCE 2D § 45:193 (1964). See also Terbell, Developments in Standard Automobile
Liability Coverage, 35 NEB, L. REv. 363, 370 (1956).
5. Howe v. Cromley, Jones & Cromley Co., 44 Ohio L. Abs. 115, 119, 57 N.E.2d
415, 418 (Ct. App. 1944).
6. Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Ky. Ct. App.
1957).
7. Fullilove v. United States Cas. Co. of N.Y., 240 La. 859, 125 So. 2d 389 (1960).
One court, however, found the same language to be ambiguous and construed it to
cover an automobile acquired in the interim between the filing of an application
for insurance and the date upon which the policy became effective. Boston Ins. Co. v.
Smith, 149 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
8. See note 2 supra.
9. See note 2 supra.
10. E.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Trenner, 35 F. Supp. 643 (E.D. Pa. 1939); Dodson
v. Newark Ins. Co., 143 S.E.2d 445 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965).
11. E.g., Conn v. Walling, 186 Kan. 242, 349 P .2d 925 (1960). This rule is particu-
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However, even absent an ambiguity, the decision in Gaunt v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,12 indicates that the inequity
resulting from a literal reading of the terms of an insurance contract
might justify a court's ignoring those terms and construing the pro-visions in a manner consistent with the understanding of the insured. The Gaunt court, while admitting that it might be doing violence to the language of the life insurance policy before it, felt
compelled to interpret the policy as a layman would, in order to
protect the insured. A concurring opinion, urging the court to take
an additional step, stated that the court should not even attempt to
interpret the language of the provision in dispute, for interpretation
in a given case would only perpetuate uncertainty in insurance
contracts.13 It further suggested that the court's decision should
be based solely on the inequity which would result if the insured
were not protected in his interpretation of the language of the
disputed provision. Thus, in the principal case, if it were reasonable
for the insured to consider the replacement automobile included
under the automatic coverage clause, the court, on the basis of the
above authority, would have been justified in reaching its decision
regardless of whether an ambiguity existed.
Public policy would also appear to favor the approach taken in
the principal case. As mentioned above, an insured party might
interpret the clause extending automatic coverage as including a
previously owned but inoperable vehicle that replaced a "Described
Automobile." He would, therefore, begin operating the replacement car without notifying the insurer of the substitution. In the
event of an accident, if the clause were construed against the insured, not only would he be deprived of protection because he was
misled by the clause, but, in addition, an injured person might be
denied adequate compensation. Rather than subjecting these two
parties, neither of whom was in a position to alter the terms of the
insurance contract, to such consequences, public policy would seemingly favor holding the insurance company liable.
Extending insurance coverage as quickly as possible .would appear to be in the best interest of the insurer, the insured, and the
public. 14 From the standpoint of the insurer, the automatic extenIarly appropriate in the case of insurance policies where the insured has little or no
power to alter the terms of the policy.
12. 160 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947). The case involved a
suit by the beneficiary of a life insurance policy. The main issue was whether the
policy was effective upon completion of the medical examination or upon acceptance
of the policy by the company. The court held that although the language would
seem to say that the policy must first be accepted by the insurance company, the
insured should be protected in his reasonable reliance since the medical examination
had been passed and a premium had been paid.
13. 160 F.2d at 603.
14. See Home Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Rose, 150 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1945); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Toney, 178 Va. 196, 16 S.E.2d 340 (1941).
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sion of coverage eliminates the need for the insured to change the
policy when replacing the "Described Automobile," and therefore
removes an opportunity to change insurance companies.15 The
insured would be afforded immediate financial protection. Finally, a
person injured in an accident involving the replacement automobile
who had a valid claim for recovery would also be assured of compensation since the insurer would be liable from the moment that
the vehicle comes into use. Recognizing this community of interests,
the insurance companies have extended automatic coverage to cars
purchased after issuance of a policy. The same factors that prompt
an insurance company to extend such coverage to a newly purchased automobile, however, are equally applicable to the situation
in the principal case. There is a similar need for the immediate
protection of the insured and the public, and the risk of liability to
the insurer is not increased, 16 for in both cases there would be only
one vehicle in operation at any given time. In the principal case, for
example, the previously owned automobile (Ford) was inoperable
until it replaced the "Described Automobile" (Cadillac), and thereafter the "Described Automobile" was not used. The opportunity
for fraud does not appear to be any greater in this situation than
when the second vehicle has been purchased after the issuance of the
policy. In both cases the burden would be upon the insured to show
that two automobiles were not being used simultaneously, although
the nature of the insured's proof would be different. When the
insured owned both cars before the issuance of the policy, he would
have to show that the vehicle which was not described in the policy
was inoperable until it replaced the "Described Automobile," and
that thereafter the "Described Automobile" was not used.17 The
condition of the replacement car is unimportant, because any car
15. This advantage to the insurance company was recognized in Quaderer v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 263 Minn. 383, 388, 116 N.W.2d 605, 609 (1962).
16. Boston Ins. Co. v. Smith, 149 So. 2d 68, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1963).
17. There are other possibilities involving replacement which might arise. The
first is where the previously owned automobile, not described in the policy, was in
working order but not used until the described automobile became inoperable. Here
it would seem that the previously owned automobile should not be covered for the
possibilities of fraud on the insurance company would be too great. The insurance
companies would be offered no protection against simultaneous operation of both
cars and, in effect, both would be covered. However, a simple test to determine
whether coverage should be extended would be licensing. That is, if the previously
owned car were licensed before replacement, insurance should not be extended, while
if the replacement automobile were not licensed, there would seem to be no reason
for denying coverage. Second, there is the possibility that the insured might replace
the described automobile with one he already owned, but which had been previously
insured by another company. Should the insured choose to adopt this course of action
and cancel the policy originally covering the substitute vehicle, there would seem
to be no reason for not extending coverage to this car under the automatic renewal
clause; only one car would be covered at any given time, and there would be scant
opportunity for fraud, for the existence of previous insurance coverage of the replacement automobile could be easily determined.
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purchased as a substitute after the issuance of the policy would
unquestionably be covered. 18 Indeed, if the insured had sold his
1956 Ford, and, after obtaining the policy, repurchased the car
as a substitute for the Cadillac, the Ford would have been covered. 19
If, however, insurance companies believe that the interpretation
of the principal case provides too great an opportunity for fraud,
they can apply to the insurance commissioner for permission either
to eliminate the "Newly Acquired Automobile" clause, or to require notice of a substitution before coverage is extended.
In the interests of equity, the insured's reasonable interpretation
of the terms of his insurance policy should be accepted, and in the
interest of society, those injured in automobile accidents should be
assured of adequate compensation. In the principal case, the court
protected both interests without placing undue, or even increased,
burdens upon the insurer.

18. See, e.g., Yenowine v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 342 F.2d 957 (6th Cir.
1965).
19. See Hardt v. Travelers Fire Sur. Co., 8 Pa. D. & C.2d 109 (C.P. 1955).

